FOREIGN POLICY: AREAS OF CONCERN. Sir Geoffrey Howe, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, at the London Diplomatic Association on March 6, 1984. British Information Services Policy Statement 14/84, 9 March 1984 by unknown
.. 
BRITISH INFORMATION SERVICES 
March 9, 1984 POLICY STATEMENTS 
14/84. FOREIGN POLICY: AREAS OF CONCERN 
Sir Geoffre 
or Foreign an Commonwea t airs, 
at the London Diplomatic Association 
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Britain is keen to put relations with a democratic Argentina 
back onto a more normal footing, Sir Geoffrey Howe, the Secretary 
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, said when he 
addressed the London Diplomatic Association in London on March 6. 
"We made a number of proposals to them in Jc;1nuary and we have 
now had a considered reply which we are studying." he said. 
In his speech, Sir Geoffrey looked at a number of foreign 
issues -- NATO and East-West relations, the European Community, 
the Falklands, Hong Kong and Southern Africa. 
He said: 
"I have been Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary 
for less than a year; and I am still struck --
though no longer surprised -- by the vast range 
of the subjects which cross my desk. It is a 
natural reaction to try to group them for better 
understanding into blocks that make sense; and the 
alphabetical order of the filing cabinet, from 
Afghanistan to Zimbabwe, has only limited value 
in this respect. 
"A more helpful approach -- although all attempts 
at packaging have their disadvantages -- is to 
divide the British interest in most overseas 
issues into three broad categories. 
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1. There are the questions of most imme-
diate importance to our security and 
prosperity; the questions which are 
at the heart of our relationship with 
our Allies in NATO and ou~ partners in 
the Community. 
2. There are the questions outside this 
central area which have particular 
importance because Britain has a di!"ect 
responsibility in the matter. 
3. There are major questions which do not 
fall into either of the first two cate-
gories; where Britain has a direct 
interest but only limited influence. 
Here we try to work with others to 
lessen threats to peace and security in 
the world and to encour&ge stability and 
economic growth. 
la) NATO And East/West Relations 
"In the first category, the Atlantic Alliance remains the 
foundation stone of our security and of that of Western 
Europe as a whole. It is a defensive Alliance and always 
will be. We mean it when we say that we,will not be the 
first to resort to weapons. Our societies are open, our 
democracies vigorous, and any free and unbiased observer 
can see that what we say is true. 
"It is also a strong Alliance and we aim to keep it that 
way. It is based on one fundamental reality: that in 
order effectively to deter the potential Soviet threat 
to our freedom and way of life, the Allied nations on 
both sides of the Atlantic -- the U.S., Canada and the 
Europeans -- must stand together. That is why succes-
sive British Governments irrespective of party, have 
attached so much importance to maintaining a strong 
relationship with the United States. 
"And this is precisely what has been achieved and main-
tained over the 35 years of the Alliance. You would not 
always think so to listen to the commentators, who have 
been diagnosing rifts and predicting crises for almost 
as long as I can remember. But the Alliance has not 
~eached its 35th anniversary in good order on a basis 
of complacency. Nor is there room for complacency now. 
There have been difficulties in the past, as there will 
no doubt be in the future. But I have no doubt that 
they can be successfully handled. 
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"It goes without saying that this success will be of 
the greatest importance to the members of the Alliance 
themselves. But there is more to it than that. The 
security we want for ourselves is not security at the 
expense of others. A strong Western Alliance is no 
threat to anyone. The security that it provides is and 
must remain the basis for the peaceful and prosperous 
Europe we all want to see. 
"The British Government will continue to play a 
in making sure that this basis remains strong. 
working to build on it a realistic and lasting 
ment in East/West relations. 
full part 
And in 
improve-
"I don't think that anyone here today would dispute the 
need for this improvement. The fact that the Soviet 
chair in Geneva remains empty is just one striking 
example of what I am talking about. I hope that wiser 
thoughts will prevail in Moscow. There is no place for 
walkouts in such a crucially important field. 
"At the same time, we must recognize that negotiations on 
arms control, for all their importance, cannot bear the 
whole of the weight of East/West relations. There is 
work to be done also in the wider political field to 
establish a broader understanding with the Soviet Upion 
and Eastern Europe. We have no illusions about the 
extent of the differences between East and West; nor do 
we expect them to disappear overnight. But there is 
plenty to talk about. And, as far as the West is ~on-
cerned, the message is clear: the door to the negotiat-
ing chamber has always been open, and it remains open. 
"The Ministerial meeting of the No·rth Atlantic Council 
which I attended in Brussels last December made this 
unmistakeably clear.· We want, and are ready to work 
for, a balanced and constructive relationship with the 
Soviet Union and-with the countries of Eastern Europe. 
"Since then, some progress has been made -- admittedly in 
a gradual and undramatic way. The CDE has opened at 
Stockholm.· I had a useful meeting with Mr. Gromyko_ there, 
as did many of my Western colleagues. We agreed, as Mr. 
Gromyko put it, to seriousify our relationship. Serious-
ify may not be the longest-established word in the. 
English language ... But it is a very good word for all 
that. Mrs. Thatcher, who visited Budapest in February, 
was able to reinforce the message in her talks with 
Mr. Kadar and other Hungarian leaders. And she and I 
did the same when we attended President Andropov's 
funeral in Moscow and met Mr. Chernenko and Mr. Gromyko 
there. 
"I have no doubt that there is scope for steady and 
sustainable progress in East/West relations on the 
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basis that we have suggested. And I have equally no 
doubt that such progress is as much in the interest 
of the East as it is of the West. 
lb) European Community 
"Our relationship with our partners in the Community 
also falls into the first of the three categories I 
suggested. I see no contradiction for British interests 
between the maintenance of a strong Atlantic Alliance 
and the development of a greater sense of European 
identity. 
"This is true even in the defense field. We would like 
to see great cooperation among the Europeans on defense 
matters. The foundations in terms of common projects 
and organizations already exist. Providing it does not 
undermine the vital transatlantic links on which our 
security ultimately depends, any initiative which can 
usefully promote greater collaboration on security issues 
among European nations will certainly have British 
support. 
"But cooperation with the countries of Western Europe in 
defense matters is of course only one part of the picture. 
British membership of the European Community is increas-
ingly central to our foreign policy. That fact is · 
certainly reflected in the volume of paper on the Commun-
ity crossing my desk -- and by the amount of time I spend 
in Brussels and other Community capitals. 
"It must sometimes be tempting -- even for professional 
observers like you -- to see the Community in headline 
terms of crisis or breakthrough. But the truth about 
the Community is less dramatic. That the Athens Summit 
failed to reach agreement is certainly true. But it is 
not the whole truth -- nor even the most important part 
of the truth. 
"For that, you must look below the surface to the real 
progress achieved in the 25 days of negotiation by 
Foreign Ministers which preceded Athens. And to the 
similar negotiations which are taking place in the run-up 
to the March European Council. 
"I was asked just recently by a reporter why it was that, 
with so many other major issues at stake, European 
Foreign Ministers devoted so much time to the nuts and 
bolts of the Community agenda at the expense, say, of the 
Middle East or disarmament. We must of course do both if 
the Community is to play its full part in the affairs of 
the world. But these are not separate, unrelated tasks. 
The Community is the world's largest economic grouping. 
As such, the arrangements it makes with its trading 
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partners -- in developed and developing countries 
alike -- have an enormous economic and political 
impact. Similarly, the Community's ability to 
develop and to welcome new members depends upon its being in 
sound shape itself, And, however esoteric the subject 
matter of the present grand negotiation may seem, its 
successful conclusion is of major importance to the 
230 million people who make up the European Community. 
"And this is why decision-making in the Community is 
often so difficult. We are not adopting empty declara-
tions. We are taking decisions which have to be 
implemented by every member state and must, therefore, 
be acceptable to all. For example, we are trying to 
establish, at the Community level, the same kind of 
Budget discipline which each of us as individual member 
states has had to accept at the national level. These 
are not questions which can be settled by generalities, 
or by taking votes. The answer will have to be built 
up carefully, block by block; and the outcome will have 
to be one with which all the member states are in 
agreement. 
"Some of the questions involved -- including of course, 
the question of Budgetary imbalances -- are of very great 
interest to Britain. But these are not British problems 
or Danish problems or Belgian problems. They are problems 
which have to be tackled if the Community is to meet the 
challenge of enlargement and future development with the 
dynamism and success which we all want to see. 
"At the moment, the negotiations are still very much on 
course. And the fact that all Ten member states press 
their national interest should not be a cause for shocked 
surprise. But each also has a national interest in the 
Community as a whole. So there is nothing unreconcilable 
in the apparent paradox that what emerges from the nego-
tiations must be a collective agreement by the Ten which 
is in the national interest of each member state. For 
each of us is convinced that we have to make decisive 
progress in the very near future. Our national interests 
and those of all our partners are such that we cannot 
allow the Community to decay. These then are the central 
issues -- the ones of fundamental importance where we work 
through and with our partners and Allies. 
2a) The Falklands 
"Let me now turn to the.second category; and take by way 
of example two questions for which Britain has a direct 
responsibility which are currently much in the news: 
the Falklands and Hong Kong. 
/"The 
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"The first thing to understand about these two subjects 
is that each is quite separate; and that solutions must 
be found which fully respect the specific circumstances 
of the individual case. 
"But the two do sometimes tend to be looked at as 
examples -- albeit quite separate examples -- of the 
same sort of foreign policy preoccupation. On the other 
hand, it can be argued that the territories concerned 
are not vital to our central foreign policy objectives. 
On the other, there is no doubt at all about their 
continuing importance on my agenda and that of my 
colleagues. 
"The argument that these problems are not central in fact 
takes too narrow a view of British foreign policy. And 
too narrow a view of what the British people think right 
and what they want to achieve. And it overlooks the 
importance for Britain's reputation of being seen to handle 
the problems associated with these territories in a way 
which accords with our general desire to see a peaceful, 
just and democratic world. 
"The Falklands are a good example of what I mean. Two 
years ago, most British people would probably not have 
given the islands a prominent place on their political 
agenda, but the invasion and its aftermath made an 
enormous impression on the British public: nothing can 
be quite the same again. 
"Let me explain the importance of the issues at stake. 
The islands are British territory. We know of course that 
Argentina also claims sovereignty over them. At the time 
of the Argentine invasion in April 1982, we were engaged 
in negotiations which covered all the subjects in dispute 
between us. After the traumatic events of the Falklands 
War, with its tragic loss of human life, we and the 
Islanders need to be absolutely sure that such a thing 
will never happen again. That is why we have had to make 
the military dispositions necessary to defend the islands. 
"Our commitment to honor the wishes of the Islanders is 
firm. Some have said that the views of 1,800 people 
should not determine British policy. But the right to 
self-determination applies whether the people concerned 
number 1,800 or 18 million. It is a right that we shall 
continue to uphold for the Falkland Islanders. 
"We have welcomed the restoration of democracy and the 
arrival of President Alfonsin in Argentina. We hope that 
the new Argentine Government will come to see that the 
democratic choice which brought them to power must apply 
equally to the Falkland Islanders. 
/ "We ... 
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nwe are keen to put our relations with democratic 
Argentina back onto a more normal footing. You will 
have read in the press that we made a number of pro-
posals to them in January. We have now had a con-
sidered reply which we are studying. The details must 
remain confidential. But one thing is clear: we want 
to move on to the kind of relations which should exist 
between Britain and Argentina. 
2b) Hong Kong 
Let me now turn for a moment to the quite different case 
of Hong Kong. I dare say that you would all regard it 
as a diplomatic equivalent of a journalist's scoop if 
I revealed today anything very new on the negotiations 
with China. Equally, I know that as diplomats you will 
understand why, by common agreement, the content of the 
talks is confidential. Progress can best be ensured by 
enabling the negotiators on both sides to pursue their 
task quietly and calmly. And there is no doubt that 
progress has been made. It has a firm basis because the 
two sides share a common objective: the continued stabi-
lity and prosperity of Hong Kong. This in turn requires 
arrangements to ensure that confidence there is maintained. 
"The people, who naturally, are most interested in what 
the future will have to offer are all those who live and 
work in Hong Kong. The British Government is keeping in 
close touch with opinion there, notably through the 
Governor and through his Executive Council. And our aim 
in the negotiations with the Chinese Government remains 
what it has been from the outset: an agreement acceptable 
to Parliament, to the Chinese Government and to the people 
of Hong Kong. 
3a) Southern Africa 
"That brings me to the third category: to issues outside 
Europe where Britain has a real interest in what is going 
on -- and in helping find solutions to problems -- but 
where we have no direct responsibility and only limited 
influence. This means in many cases that we need to 
work with others -- usually outside the formal framework 
of the Alliance or the Community -- to promote the 
interests we share with our friends. Our membership of 
the Commonwealth is of particular interest in this connec-
tion. So too, of course, is the fact that we have special 
responsibilities as one of the five Permanent Members of 
the United Nations Security Council. 
"This third category, as you will have guessed, is a very 
wide one. And you will be uneasily aware that there are 
all too many examples that I could choose from to illus-
trate it. The Lebanon, the Gulf War, and Central America 
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are among the most topical, and among the most important. 
But there are limits even to the patience of a profes-
sion2l diplomat, and I do not want to strain it too far. 
So let me take but one example, that of Southern Africa, 
and try to explain what our interests are and how we 
promote them. 
"British interests are very much involved, both materially 
and politically, on both sides of the Limpopo. We are 
there as major trading partners and as major investors. 
There are U.K. passport holders in South Africa and there 
are U.K. passport holders in Zimbabwe and elsewhere. 
Many countries in the region are members of the Common-
wealth. Our ties with them are therefore particularly 
close, and they have tended to look to us for assistance 
and support in times of difficulty. And we share with 
the other Western countries --and with the countries of 
the region itself -- a general interest in promoting 
stability and avoiding a polarization between East and 
West which could only do damage. 
"What we want to see in Southern Africa is reduction in 
tension there, and peaceful evolution. For too long both 
our interests and those of the people of the region have 
been threatened by problems stemming from the impasse in 
Namibia and from the friction between South Africa and its 
neighbors. The consequent uncertainty and instability 
have been exploited by outsiders who seem much happier 
supplying machine-guns than machine tools, and whose 
contribution is essentially destructive. 
"We, for our part, have done our best to ensure that our 
contribution should be the opposite of that. This has 
been true of the part we have played in the Western Contact 
Group on Namibia. And true, also, of our bilateral rela-
tions with the front line states. I am glad to see these 
relations developing, not only with our old friends in the 
Commonwealth -- where we continue to be closely involved 
-- but also with Angola and Mozambique. 
"Our relations with the Republic of South Africa are part 
of this wider picture. We fully recognize that there is 
a very important moral issue at stake in South Africa. 
We wish, as much as anyone else, to see peaceful evolu-
tionary change towards a system of Government that is 
firmly rooted in the principle of Government by consent 
of the governed. And we will continue to use all the 
influence we have -- though it is less than some people 
suppose -- to encourage peaceful reform. 
"That is what our policy is based on. The cornerstone of 
our approach is contact. Without this we see no hope of 
influencing South Africa in a positive sense. 
/"This 
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"This approach is shared by our major Western partners. 
I cannot claim that it has achieved miracles: but I 
see no greater promise of success -- and many very 
serious disadvantages -- in the alternative prescrip-
tions which have been advocated. 
"Although the parallel is not a direct one I think we 
can take some encouragement from the example of Namibia. 
Progress has of course been much too slow. But the 
settlement plan -- which came about as a result of a 
remarkable collective diplomatic effort involving close 
cooperation between the Western Group and the front line 
states -- is still very much alive. Indeed the omens 
seem better than for same time. Similarly, there is some 
encouragement to be drawn from other recent events in the 
region, including the current talks between Mozambique 
and South Africa. It would be very much in the long 
term interests of all the people of the region if South 
Africa and her neighbors were to get down to practical 
cooperation. There are signs that this may be happening, 
and that cross-border violence is being seen for the 
short-sighted and destructive policy that it undoubtedly 
is whether the border is crossed from the north or from 
the south." 
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